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Privileging Opinion, Denigrating
Discourse: How the Law of Defamation
Incentivizes News Talk-Show Hyperbole
Clay Calvert

Abstract
This Article examines how defamation law promotes a culture of
hyperbole and exaggeration on television news talk shows at the expense of
more meaningful dialogue and discourse. The Article uses the 2020 federal
court rulings in McDougal v. Fox News Network, LLC and Herring
Networks, Inc. v. Maddow as analytical springboards to address this
problem. In both cases, judges dismissed defamation claims stemming from
comments made by well-known talk-show hosts—Fox News’s Tucker
Carlson in McDougal and MSNBC’s Rachel Maddow in Herring
Networks—on the ground that their remarks would not be understood by
viewers as factual assertions. In concluding that Carlson’s and Maddow’s
statements amounted to nonactionable expressions of opinion, the judges
evaluated the nature of news talk shows and reasoned that they constitute
venues where viewers today expect bombast and bluster. While the
outcomes are laudable for safeguarding political opinions, they are highly
problematic for a democratic society because they incentivize hyperbole
over rational discussion of political topics that affect voters’ decisions. In
brief, Carlson and Maddow are allowed to cast aspersions and then to claim
in their defense that no one would believe them as factual assertions. The
 Professor of Law, Brechner Eminent Scholar in Mass Communication and Director of the
Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project at the University of Florida in Gainesville, Fla. B.A.,
1987, Communication, Stanford University; J.D. (Order of the Coif), 1991, McGeorge School of
Law, University of the Pacific; Ph.D., 1996, Communication, Stanford University. The author
thanks Natanel Wainer of the University of Florida Levin College of Law for his assistance with this
Article.
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more hosts ratchet up the level of rhetoric on their shows and cultivate
reputations for bloviation, the more likely they are to successfully defend
against defamation lawsuits. This Article argues that courts in future
defamation cases should consider news talk shows on a program-byprogram basis rather than continue to flesh out a nascent, genre-based
presumption that news talk shows as a whole trade in protected opinions.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In September 2020, a federal court dismissed a defamation case against
Fox News Network stemming from talk-show host Tucker Carlson’s
assertion that former Playboy model Karen McDougal had engaged in “a
classic case of extortion” against President Donald J. Trump.1 In tossing out
McDougal’s lawsuit, United States District Judge Mary Kay Vyskocil
deemed the accusation “nonactionable hyperbole,”2 rather than a provably
false factual assertion of criminal activity that would have allowed the claim
to proceed.3 In brief, it fell on the opinion side of the often blurry line in
defamation law separating protected opinions from actionable facts.4
Judge Vyskocil’s conclusion, standing alone, is neither intriguing nor
groundbreaking. After all, it is well established that rhetorical hyperbole is
shielded from liability in defamation law.5 Such speech is safeguarded
“because the language used is so expansive that the reader or listener knows
it is only an opinion, that it is not an assertion of fact.”6 Furthermore, the
outcome was unsurprising because the United States Supreme Court already
had determined that words similar to extortion, such as “blackmail”7 and
“scab,”8 are protected when loosely deployed.
1. McDougal v. Fox News Network, LLC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175768, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
24, 2020).
2. Id. at *16.
3. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1990) (noting that “a statement on
matters of public concern must be provable as false before there can be liability under state
defamation law,” and adding that “a statement of opinion relating to matters of public concern which
does not contain a provably false factual connotation will receive full constitutional protection”); see
also Moldea v. New York Times Co., 22 F.3d 310, 314 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (observing that “an
accusation of criminal conduct is a classic libel”).
4. See Robert D. Sack, Sack on Defamation: Libel, Slander and Related Problems § 4:1, at 4–3
to 4–4 (5th ed. 2017) (“No task undertaken under the law of defamation is more elusive than
distinguishing between fact and opinion.”).
5. See, e.g., Sindi v. El-Moslimany, 896 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2018) (“Statements that are merely
‘imaginative expression’ or ‘rhetorical hyperbole’—in other words, statements that ‘no reasonable
person would believe presented facts’—are not actionable.” (quoting Levinsky’s, Inc. v. Wal-Mart
Stores, 127 F.3d 122, 128 (1st Cir. 1997)); Pierson v. Nat’l Inst. for Labor Rels. Research, 319 F.
Supp. 3d 1100, 1108 (N.D. Ind. 2018) (“Rhetorical hyperbole is a well-recognized category of
‘privileged defamation.’”) (quoting Dilworth v. Dudley, 75 F.3d 307, 309 (7th Cir. 1996)).
6. Clay Calvert, Daniel V. Kozlowski & Derigan Silver, Mass Media Law 237 (21st ed. 2020).
7. See Greenbelt Coop. Pub. Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970) (concluding that “even the
most careless reader must have perceived that the word [blackmail] was no more than rhetorical
hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by those who considered Bresler’s negotiating position extremely
unreasonable”).
8. See Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264,

54

[Vol. 2020: 51]

Privileging Opinion, Denigrating Discourse
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

What is notable, however, about Judge Vyskocil’s analysis in McDougal
v. Fox News Network LLC9 is that it adds to growing judicial recognition
that statements uttered on news-oriented talk shows should be presumptively
discounted by viewers as bluster and bombast.10 As Judge Vyskocil put it
when discussing Fox News’s “Tucker Carlson Tonight” program, the
“‘general tenor’ of the show should . . . inform a viewer that he is not
‘stating actual facts’ about the topics he discusses and is instead engaging in
‘exaggeration’ and ‘non-literal commentary.’”11 She deemed persuasive Fox
News Network’s argument “that given Mr. Carlson’s reputation, any
reasonable viewer ‘arrive[s] with an appropriate amount of skepticism’
about the statements he makes.”12
Judge Vyskocil added that a
determination of rhetorical hyperbole is especially likely “in the context of
commentary talk shows like the one at issue here, which often use
‘increasingly barbed’ language to address issues in the news.”13
This logic is extremely important. It provides a legal incentive for news
talk shows to ramp up their general level of bloviation and exaggeration in
order to defend against defamation lawsuits. In a nutshell, and as the title of
this Article connotes, cases such as McDougal laudably protect and privilege
political opinions but, in doing so, they also exacerbate the erosion of
meaningful dialogue and discourse on news talk shows by incentivizing
hyperbole. Bluntly stated, Tucker Carlson’s brand of political discussion
allows him to cast aspersions and then to claim no one would believe them
as factual statements.14 Or, as Hollywood Reporter legal correspondent Eriq
285–86 (1974) (concluding that “Jack London’s ‘definition of a scab’ is merely rhetorical hyperbole,
a lusty and imaginative expression of the contempt felt by union members towards those who refuse
to join").
9. 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175768 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2020).
10. As addressed below, McDougal follows closely on the heels of another federal district court
decision, Herring Networks, Inc. v. Maddow, 445 F. Supp. 3d 1042 (S.D. Cal. 2020), involving a
defamation case stemming from comments uttered by the host of a cable news channel talk show.
See infra notes 21–30 and accompanying text (addressing Herring Networks).
11. McDougal, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175768, at *17 (quoting Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497
U.S. 1, 20–21 (1990); Levinsky's, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 127 F.3d 122, 128 (1st Cir. 1997)).
12. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 600 W. 115th Corp. v. Von Gutfeld, 603 N.E.2d 930, 936
(1992)).
13. Id. at *14 (citing Rodney A. Smolla, 1 Law of Defamation § 6:92 (2d ed. 2020)).
14. As one newspaper tidily encapsulated the latter part of this principle in reporting on Judge
Vyskocil’s ruling, “Mr. Carlson’s viewers may not necessarily believe everything they hear.”
Michael M. Grynbaum & Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, Karen McDougal’s Defamation Suit Against
Fox News is Dismissed, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/24/
business/media/tucker-carlson-karen-mcdougal-lawsuit.html.
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Gardner rather wryly wrote in summing up the ruling, “[d]on’t always
mistake what Tucker Carlson says for fact.”15 Indeed, Judge Vyskocil
reasoned that Carlson’s “overheated rhetoric is precisely the kind of pitched
commentary that one expects when tuning in to talk shows like Tucker
Carlson Tonight, with pundits debating the latest political controversies.”16
The irony of Fox News Network’s defense here is readily apparent:
Statements made on a news channel should not be trusted or treated as
factual.17
To be clear, Judge Vyskocil did not go so far to as to hold that the
extortion accusation was an opinion solely because it was leveled on Tucker
Carlson Tonight. The nature of Carlson’s program, instead, was one facet of
a larger contextual picture. That broader framework included:
1) the fact that “accusations of crimes [such as extortion] . . . are
unlikely to be defamatory when, as here, they are made in connection with
debates on a matter of public or political importance;”18
2) Carlson’s statements, both before and after the extortion allegation,
suggested he was pointing out apparent hypocrisy;19 and
3) what Judge Vyskocil called “disclaimers” uttered by Carlson,
including openly casting doubt on his own source for the extortion
allegation—former Trump attorney Michael Cohen—and Carlson’s use of
the modifying phrase “sounds like” immediately prior to uttering “a classic
case of extortion.”20
Significantly, McDougal was not the only 2020 defamation case
involving a talk show on a cable news channel in which a judge pointed to
the nature of the program as a key factor for holding that a statement was
protected opinion. Herring Networks, Inc. v. Maddow21 centered on a claim
by the owner of the heavily conservative-leaning One America News

15. Eriq Gardner, Fox News Beats Lawsuit Over Tucker Carlson’s “Extortion” Analogy,
HOLLYWOOD REP. (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/fox-news-beatslawsuit-over-tucker-carlsons-extortion-analogy.
16. McDougal, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175768, at *19.
17. As the author of this Article told Washington Post media critic Erik Wemple, there is “more
than a small dose of irony in arguing in your defense that what you are stating on a news network is
not factual.” Erik Wemple, The Recklessness of Tucker Carlson, WASH. POST (June 26, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/26/recklessness-tucker-carlson/.
18. McDougal, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175768, at *14.
19. Id. at *15
20. Id. at *18.
21. 445 F. Supp. 3d 1042 (S.D. Cal. 2020).
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Network (“OAN”) against MSNBC talk-show host Rachel Maddow.22
During a July 2019 segment of The Rachel Maddow Show, the eponymous
host asserted that OAN is “the most obsequiously pro-Trump right wing
news outlet in America [and] really literally is paid Russian propaganda.”23
United States District Judge Cynthia Bashant concluded that the “really
literally is paid Russian propaganda” assertion was protected opinion and
she dismissed the complaint.24
In reaching that determination, she addressed several variables,
including the forum of the The Rachel Maddow Show.25 The judge noted
that while viewers of news channels want facts, “Maddow made the
allegedly defamatory statement on her own talk show news segment where
she is invited and encouraged to share her opinions with her viewers.”26 In
brief, Judge Bashant drew a pivotal boundary separating a newscast from a
news talk show, with the former providing a venue where one expects facts
and the latter offering a location where one anticipates opinions.27 The
“medium” of a news talk show, to use Judge Bashant’s term, thus made “it
more likely that a reasonable viewer would not conclude that the contested
statement implies an assertion of objective fact.”28 That holding is not
surprising, particularly given that Maddow delivers remarks on her show in
a format that one media critic calls “sarcasm news,” replete with “ironic
Maddowian intonations.”29 The case is now on appeal to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, with an attorney for Herring Networks
22. See Erik Wemple, Vanity Fair ‘Updates’ Story About Donald Trump Jr., OAN, WASH. POST
(May 9, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/05/09/vanity-fair-updates-storyabout-donald-trump-jr-oan/ (contending that OAN “takes a back seat to no one—not even Fox
News’s ‘Hannity’—when it comes to jaw-dropping innovations in pro-Trump news coverage”).
23. Herring Networks, 445 F. Supp. 3d at 1046.
24. Id. at 1054.
25. In addition to addressing the forum of the The Rachel Maddow Show, the court also
considered: 1) the nature of the entire segment in which Maddow made her allegedly defamatory
remarks, and 2) the specific context of the “language surrounding the allegedly defamatory
statement” by Maddow, including the fact that Maddow was openly drawing much of her views
from a Daily Beast article that described how a reporter for OAN was also being paid for her work
with a Russian propaganda outlet called Sputnik. Id. at 1051–53.
26. Id. at 1049.
27. See id. at 1050 (opining that “Maddow’s show is different than a typical news segment where
anchors inform viewers about the daily news. The point of Maddow’s show is for her to provide the
news but also to offer her opinions as to that news”).
28. Id.
29. Alissa Quart, The Sarcastic Times, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Mar./Apr. 2009),
https://archives.cjr.org/essay/the_sarcastic_times.php?page=all.
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contending that “[t]he words—’that OAN is really literally paid Russian
propaganda’—do not convey an opinion. This is a blatant defamatory
falsehood.”30
This Article initially explains in Part II how the decisions in both
McDougal and Herring Networks: 1) fully comport with the principle that
opinions about politics and matters of public concern are privileged in First
Amendment31 jurisprudence, and 2) square with the notion that context is
key when determining if a statement is one of fact or opinion.32 Part III then
argues that despite such congruency with extant legal principles, McDougal
and Herring Networks unfortunately foster a communicative environment on
news talk shows that encourages—maybe even values—”overheated
rhetoric,”33 “exaggeration”34 and “colorful commentary”35 by transforming
those communicative characteristics into a key facet of an opinion defense
against defamation lawsuits targeting comments by the hosts of such
programs.36 In other words, just as courts today in defamation cases hold
that audiences should expect opinions and hyperbole when speech is
conveyed in online social media fora,37 so too should the viewers of
30. Press Release, Herring Networks, Inc., One America News Elevates $10 Million Defamation
Lawsuit Against Rachel Maddow and MSNBC to Ninth Circuit, OAN (June 3, 2020),
https://www.oann.com/one-america-news-elevates-10-million-defamation-lawsuit-against-rachelmaddow-and-msnbc-to-ninth-circuit/ (emphasis omitted). See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 29,
Herring Networks, Inc. v. Maddow, No. 20-55579 (9th Cir. Oct. 12, 2020) (“Maddow’s show is not
mere political punditry.”).
31. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in relevant part, that “Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free
Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated ninety-five years ago through the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties applicable for governing the actions of
state and local government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925)
(finding “that freedom of speech and of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment
from abridgment by Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States”).
32. See infra Part II.
33. McDougal v. Fox News Network, LLC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175768, *19 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
24, 2020).
34. Herring Networks, Inc. v. Maddow, 445 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1050 (S.D. Cal. 2020).
35. Id.
36. See infra Part III.
37. See Ganske v. Mensch, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151152, at *12–13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2020)
(noting that “[i]n analyzing the unique context of statements made on Internet fora, courts have
emphasized the generally informal and unedited nature of these communications,” and adding that
“the fact that Defendant’s allegedly defamatory statement that Plaintiff's tweet was ‘xenophobic’ . . .
appeared on Twitter conveys a strong signal to a reasonable reader that this was Defendant’s
opinion”); Jacobus v. Trump, 51 N.Y.S.3d 330, 339 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017) (addressing the influence

58

[Vol. 2020: 51]

Privileging Opinion, Denigrating Discourse
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

television news talk shows—as a genre of programming—expect hyperbole,
thereby instantiating into defamation law the underpinnings of a ready-made
opinion defense. In short, it pays off in defamation law for news-oriented
talk shows to routinely trade in over-the-top opinions and bombast rather
than to develop a reputation for rational, even-handed debate regarding
political issues where viewers expect fact-based assertions. Perhaps more
provocatively, decisions such as McDougal and Herring Networks reward
the likes of Fox News and MSNBC for transforming news talk shows into
infotainment spectacles.38 Part IV concludes by calling on courts to consider
the nature of specific news talk shows on a program-by-program basis in
defamation lawsuits rather than continue to flesh out a nascent, genre-based
presumption that news talk shows as a whole trade in protected opinions.39
II. THE VALUE OF POLITICAL OPINIONS IN FIRST AMENDMENT LAW AND
THE ROLE OF CONTEXT IN THE FACT-VERSUS-OPINION DICHOTOMY
This Part has two sections. Section A provides a primer on the high
value placed on opinions about political issues and matters of public concern
in First Amendment jurisprudence. Section B then addresses the pivotal role
that context plays in sorting out whether an allegedly defamatory assertion is
an actionable fact or a protected opinion.
A. The Primacy of Political Opinions Under the First Amendment
In both McDougal and Herring Networks, federal district courts
protected the ability of television news talk-show hosts to give their opinions
on politically oriented issues.40 In McDougal, the issue was whether a
woman with whom President Trump allegedly had a year-long affair about a
of the internet as a medium of expression on whether courts consider statements conveyed on it to be
fact or opinion); see also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & RonNell Andersen Jones, Of Reasonable
Readers and Unreasonable Speakers: Libel Law in a Networked World, 23 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L.
155, 178 (2016) (observing that some libel opinions “explicitly reference the informal nature of
social-media sites as a basis for branding allegedly libelous speech posted there as opinion”).
38. See CLAY CALVERT, VOYEUR NATION: MEDIA, PRIVACY, AND PEERING IN MODERN
CULTURE 103 (2000) (defining infotainment as “a bastardized hybrid of news and entertainment that
panders to viewers’ wants rather than attempting to meet their needs”).
39. See infra Part IV.
40. See McDougal v. Fox News Network, LLC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175768, at *27
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2020); Herring Networks, Inc. v. Maddow, 445 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1055 (S.D.
Cal. 2020).
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decade before he became president had later tried to extort Trump in
exchange for her silence about the matter.41 In Herring Networks, the
subject on which Rachel Maddow expressed her view was whether a news
organization known for supporting President Trump was engaged in
propaganda paid for by Russia.42
Protecting opinions on political matters is, in fact, deeply engrained in
First Amendment jurisprudence, not just within the realm of defamation
law.43 Indeed, Professor Ashutosh Bhagwat contends that speech
“advocating political opinions, no matter how objectionable . . . is clearly
entitled to well-neigh absolute constitutional protection.”44 To wit, the U.S.
Supreme Court has protected “Fuck the Draft” as an opinion regarding the
merits of conscription and the war in Vietnam.45 Similarly, it has
safeguarded the right to burn the flag of the United States of American to
express an opinion opposing the renomination of Ronald Reagan by the
Republican Party in 1984 for the position of the nation’s president.46
When it comes to tort law, the Court has invoked the First Amendment
to protect from liability members of the Westboro Baptist Church who
expressed their opinions about “the political and moral conduct of the United
States and its citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military,
and scandals involving the Catholic clergy.”47 Similarly, the Court protected
Hustler Magazine’s ability to express its opinion in a fictional ad parody that
the Reverend Jerry Falwell was a hypocrite.48 Importantly, Falwell was
more than just a religious leader; he was “active as a commentator on

41. See 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175768, at *1 (“Specifically, Ms. McDougal alleges that the host
of the show, Tucker Carlson, accused her of extorting now-President Donald J. Trump out of
approximately $150,000 in exchange for her silence about an alleged affair between Ms. McDougal
and President Trump.”).
42. 445 F. Supp. 3d at 1046.
43. See Philip Hamburger, Getting Permission, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 405, 482 (2007) (“It has
become commonplace to assume that the First Amendment primarily protects political opinion.”);
Nancy A. Millich, Compassion Fatigue and the First Amendment: Are the Homeless Constitutional
Castaways?, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 225, 276 (1994) (“First Amendment protection is at its
strongest when government seeks to regulate expression of political opinions.”).
44. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Details: Specific Facts and the First Amendment, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 1,
60 (2012).
45. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971).
46. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989).
47. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454 (2011).
48. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48 (1988).
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politics and public affairs,”49 thus rendering the ability to issue opinions
critical of him even more imperative. Indeed, in ruling in favor of Hustler
Magazine and its publisher, Larry Flynt, the Court stressed “the fundamental
importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public
interest and concern” under the First Amendment.50 This taps into the
Court’s observation in the defamation case of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
that the proper remedy for opinions with which one disagrees is not to be
found in a court of law, but rather by voicing competing opinions in the
metaphorical marketplace of ideas.51
Indeed, in the defamation case of Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., the
Court clarified that “a statement of opinion relating to matters of public
concern which does not contain a provably false factual connotation will
receive full constitutional protection.”52 The Court in Milkovich added that
requiring defamation plaintiffs to prove that a message states actual facts
about them assures “that public debate will not suffer for lack of
‘imaginative expression’ or the ‘rhetorical hyperbole’ which has
traditionally added much to the discourse of our Nation.”53 In delivering the
Court’s opinion, Chief Justice William Rehnquist noted that the use of
“loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language”54 would tend to negate that an
allegation of criminal activity was to be taken as a factual assertation.
In short, to the extent that the courts in both McDougal and Herring
Networks protected opinions relating to matters of political and public
concern, the decisions fall neatly in line with a long tradition of safeguarding
such viewpoints under the First Amendment. As the next section indicates,
those rulings also are in accord with judicial precedent that takes into
account context—including the journalistic context of where a story appears
or is broadcast—in determining if a statement should be deemed factual or
opinionated.

49. Id. at 47.
50. Id. at 50.
51. 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974) (“Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false
idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience
of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.”); see also RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE
SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 6 (1992) (“The ‘marketplace of ideas’ is perhaps the most powerful
metaphor in the free speech tradition.”).
52. 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 21.
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B. Journalistic Context in Libel Law
In distinguishing facts from opinions, lower courts today often consider
multiple factors, including the journalistic or media context in which a
statement is uttered or appears.55 Consider, for example, the state libel laws
of New York and Arizona, both of which U.S. District Judge Mary Kay
Vyskocil deemed relevant in McDougal.56 New York’s highest appellate
court has ruled that, among other factors, “either the full context of the
communication in which the statement appears or the broader social context
and surrounding circumstances are” relevant in the fact-versus-opinion
inquiry.57
Under this factor, courts examine “the over-all context in which the
assertions were made,” including “the nature of the particular forum” in
which a statement appeared or was published.58 For example, “a letter to the
editor of a professional journal [is] a medium that is typically regarded by
the public as a vehicle for the expression of individual opinion.”59 Similarly,
New York’s highest appellate court has observed that a newspaper’s
Op Ed page is a forum traditionally reserved for the airing of ideas
on matters of public concern. Indeed, the common expectation is
that the columns and articles published on a newspaper’s Op Ed
sections will represent the viewpoints of their authors and, as such,
contain considerable hyperbole, speculation, diversified forms of
expression and opinion.60
Such journalistic context standing alone, however, does not necessarily
dictate whether a statement will be characterized as fact or opinion. As the
New York Court of Appeals put it, “an article’s appearance in the sections of

55. See Sack, supra note 4, at § 4:3.1, at 4–33 to 4–34 (noting that “[a] letter to the editor, . . . an
editorial or op-ed column or broadcast, a cartoon, a critical parody or satire of a public person, a
sports column, criticism on a radio talk show, or a critical review are ordinarily not actionable”)
(internal citations omitted).
56. See McDougal v. Fox News Network, LLC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175768, at *9 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 24, 2020) (“The Court will not conduct a full choice of law analysis here . . . because . . . the
two potential sources of law—New York and Arizona—are identical on all relevant points and
because Defendant’s constitutional defenses may apply regardless of which state’s law governs.”).
57. Mann v. Abel, 885 N.E.2d 884, 886 (N.Y. 2008).
58. Brian v. Richardson, 660 N.E.2d 1126, 1130 (N.Y. 1995).
59. Id.
60. Id.
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a newspaper that are usually dedicated to opinion does not automatically
insulate the author from liability for defamation.”61 The specific journalistic
forum thus simply provides a helpful—not determinative—metric or
variable in the fact-versus-opinion analysis.62
Of particular relevance for this Article is the ruling of a New York trial
court in Huggins v. Povitch.63 It pivoted on allegedly defamatory remarks
made by a guest named Melba Moore on The Maury Povich Show, a
syndicated television talk show.64 In applying New York law, Justice
Beverly S. Cohen observed that “when . . . statements by their context, form
and purpose indicate that they are opinions and not assertions of fact, a libel
action cannot be maintained.”65 In separating facts from opinions, Justice
Cohen wrote that “the contextual approach long taken by New York”
includes examining “the nature of the particular forum” in which the
statements were made.66 Here, she focused both on the nature of talk shows
generally and, more specifically, on The Maury Povich Show.67
“The talk show format provides a forum for debate of public issues and
the expression of opinion,” Justice Cohen reasoned, adding that it involves
“give and take” between the host and the interviewees. 68 More specifically
regarding The Maury Povich Show, Justice Cohen found that it “generally
focuses upon current controversial topics of interest and debate by
presenting invited guests with relevant backgrounds to share their
experiences, observations and opinions with members of the studio
audience.”69 When viewed collectively along with other variables,70 the
nature of talk shows and The Maury Povich Show factored into Justice

61. Id.
62. See id. (noting “that the forum in which a statement has been made, as well as the other
surrounding circumstances comprising the ‘broader social setting,’ are only useful gauges for
determining whether a reasonable reader or listener would understand the complained-of assertions
as opinion or statements of fact”).
63. 1996 WL 515498 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 19, 1996).
64. Id. at *1.
65. Id. at *6.
66. Id.
67. Id. at *7.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Among other contextual factors that were relevant for Justice Cohen on the fact-versusopinion issue were the specific topic under discussion—namely, a “bitter divorce”—and the fact that
Povich and other guests repeatedly stated that the guest who uttered the allegedly defamatory
remarks was rendering “her own personal views” about the divorce in question. Id.
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Cohen’s conclusion that it would be “obvious to the viewer that hotly
contested matters are about to be discussed and that Moore’s remarks are
likely to reflect a certain personal bias that should not be taken as objective
fact.”71
Another defamation case, albeit one applying California law rather than
New York’s principles, in which a court examined the nature of a talk show
is Condit v. Dunne.72 There, United States District Judge Peter Leisure
considered the syndicated radio program The Laura Ingraham Show.73 He
did so when sorting out whether allegedly defamatory comments made on
the show by author-defendant Dominick Dunne about U.S. Congressman
Gary Condit regarding Condit’s possible connection to the disappearance of
Chandra Levy were ones of fact or opinion.74 Dunne had argued that the
forum of a radio talk show is one in which listeners recognize that guests
“offer their views on the show rather than facts.”75 Judge Leisure
acknowledged a distinction between talk shows and news publications.76 He
rather bluntly—and perhaps disparagingly toward Ingraham, were she to
view herself as a truth spreader—opined, after reviewing the transcript of
Ingraham’s interview with Dunne, that “listeners seeking the facts likely do
not tune in to ‘The Laura Ingraham Show.’”77 Yet, just as New York courts
consider the journalistic context or media forum where a statement is made
to be a useful but non-controlling factor on the fact-versus-opinion issue,78
Judge Leisure held that Dunne was not immune from liability for defamation
simply because his comments were made on Ingraham’s show.79 Indeed, the
judge concluded that other factors suggesting that Dunne’s comments would
be taken literally by listeners were sufficient to override the opinion-

71. Id.
72. 317 F. Supp. 2d 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). The court debated between applying the law of
California and the law of New York before ultimately concluding “that California has a more
significant interest in the litigation than does New York, and accordingly [the court] applies
California’s defamation law.” Id. at 355.
73. Id. at 348–50.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 362.
76. Id. at 362–63.
77. Id. at 363.
78. Supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.
79. See Condit, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 363 (“Defendant, however, is not immunized from a
defamation suit simply because he recited false accusations on a talk show as opposed to a news
program.”).
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oriented, talk-show context on which he made them.80
Although neither The Maury Povich Show in Huggins nor The Laura
Ingraham Show in Condit was a cable news channel talk show, the cases
nonetheless demonstrate that judicial consideration of the nature of a talkshow forum in cases such as McDougal and Herring Networks is not
unusual. It is, instead, par for the judicial course when sussing out the
difference between facts and opinions.
Significantly for battles such as those involving Tucker Carlson and
Rachel Maddow, New York courts also consider as part of the journalistic
forum analysis the reputation of the individual who delivers or reports the
allegedly defamatory remarks.81 This, in other words, is where it seemingly
pays off in spades—at least when it comes to defending against defamation
claims—for a news talk-show host to garner a reputation for engaging in
hyperbole, sarcasm and irony, not a straight-up delivery of facts and
opinions. Cultivating such an on-air persona and even, perhaps, promoting
it via advertisements and marketing might well spell the difference between
a statement being protected as an expression of opinion rather than subject to
liability as a factual assertion.
Arizona’s law of defamation, which Judge Vyskocil in McDougal
deemed “identical on all relevant points”82 with that of New York, also
considers “the medium and context in which the statement was published”83
in resolving the fact-versus-opinion issue. As the Arizona Court of Appeals
wrote in 1999, “[s]tatements that can be interpreted as nothing more than
rhetorical political invective, opinion, or hyperbole are protected speech.”84
In resolving whether allegedly defamatory remarks fall into one of those

80. See id. (asserting that “a reasonable listener, aware of the media frenzy and cognizant of the
apparent nature of ‘The Laura Ingraham Show,’ nonetheless could interpret defendant’s comments
as assertions of fact, because the comments themselves set forth specific, detailed bases for the
accusation that plaintiff was criminally involved in Ms. Levy’s disappearance,” and adding that
“[w]hile the setting for defendant’s comments would suggest that he merely voiced his opinion, the
suggestion is overcome by the content of defendant’s statements, because the statements can be
interpreted as explicit republications of actual, detailed facts”).
81. See Brian v. Richardson, 660 N.E.2d 1126, 1130 (N.Y. 1995) (“Finally, the identity, role and
reputation of the author may be factors to the extent that they provide the reader with clues as to the
article’s import.”).
82. McDougal v. Fox News Network, LLC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175768, at *9 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 24, 2020).
83. Sign Here Petitions LLC v. Chavez, 402 P.3d 457, 463 n.3 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017) (emphasis
in original). Arizona embraces the State of Washington’s approach in this regard. Id.
84. Burns v. Davis, 993 P.2d 1119, 1129 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
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safeguarded categories, the appellate court added that “consideration should
be given to the context and all surrounding circumstances, including the
impression created by the words used and the expression’s general tenor.”85
In short, as in the Empire State, context—including the particular medium
on which speech is conveyed—is part and parcel of the fact-versus-opinion
analysis in Arizona.
This Part illustrated that the decisions in McDougal and Herring
Networks: 1) comport with a long First Amendment tradition of
safeguarding political opinions, and 2) are in accord with typical judicial
consideration in defamation cases of the journalistic or media context in
which a statement appears or is broadcast when resolving whether it is one
of fact or opinion. The next Part, however, argues that both decisions
facilitate the denigration of discourse on news talk shows by incentivizing
hosts such as Tucker Carlson and Rachel Maddow to engage in constant
hyperbole and exaggeration in order to better defend against defamation
lawsuits.
III. THE DETERIORATION OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE: AN UNSEEMLY
FLIPSIDE OF THE FREE SPEECH VICTORIES IN MCDOUGAL AND HERRING
NETWORKS
Among the time-honored core rationales for protecting free expression
under the First Amendment is the facilitation of democratic selfgovernance.86 Alexander Meiklejohn was, as one scholar notes, “perhaps
the leading proponent of the self-government theory.”87 Meiklejohn
maintained that the dual points of ultimate interest in safeguarding political
speech are serving “the minds of the hearers”88 and “the voting of wise
decisions.”89 In other words, political discussion is essential to help citizens
make informed choices.90

85. Id.
86. See David S. Han, Transparency in First Amendment Doctrine, 65 EMORY L.J. 359, 360
(2015) (observing that one of “the foundational rationales for extending special protection to speech”
is “its necessity as a means of effectuating democratic self-governance”).
87. MATTHEW D. BUNKER, CRITIQUING FREE SPEECH: FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY AND THE
CHALLENGE OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY 9 (2001).
88. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 25
(1948).
89. Id.
90. See L EE C. B OLLINGER, T HE T OLERANT S OCIETY 46 (1986) (observing that for
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Under this Meiklejohnian view, as former Yale Law School Dean
Robert Post writes, “[t]he quality of public debate . . . is to be measured by
its capacity to facilitate public decision-making.”91 Indeed, Meiklejohn used
the metaphor of a traditional townhall meeting, where citizens come together
to discuss public issues, to also suggest that a certain amount of order is
needed to elevate the quality of this debate and to prevent a “dialectical freefor-all.”92 Today, television news talk shows are in some ways, as the author
of this Article contended more than two decades ago, the modern equivalent
of townhall meetings where matters of public concern are discussed and
debated for all to watch.93
Decisions such as those in McDougal and Herring Networks carry the
potential to erode the quality of political discourse by rewarding news talkshow hosts with an opinion defense, partly because the general tone and
tenor of their programs is loaded with colorful commentary and features
factual exaggeration,94 and, in so doing, potentially undermine wise and
informed political decision-making. Certainly, viewers expect news talkshow hosts to offer their opinions on issues. That is a given. But it is quite
another thing to build into the law a contextual presumption that seemingly

Meiklejohn, “the principle of free speech plays a practical role for a self-governing society,
protecting discussion among the citizens so that they can best decide what to do about the issues
brought before them for decision”).
91. ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT
271 (1995).
92. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 88, at 23. He added that “[t]he First Amendment . . . is not the
guardian of unregulated talkativeness.” Id. at 25.
93. Clay Calvert, Meiklejohn, Monica, & Mutilation of the Thinking Process, 26 PEPP. L. REV.
37, 56 (1998) (asserting that “television news talk shows, call-in radio, and news websites are the
modern-day equivalent of town meetings (even if the participants often are pundits or journalists
themselves)” and adding that journalists, as the moderators of these virtual townhall meetings, “must
exercise control, at the very least, because their voices at the metaphorical town meeting are
certainly the loudest and most powerful due to their increased access to the means of mass
communication for transmitting and propagating their views”).
94. See Herring Networks Inc. v. Maddow, 445 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1053 (S.D. Cal. 2020) (noting
that “Maddow had inserted her own colorful commentary into and throughout the segment, laughing,
expressing her dismay (i.e., saying ‘I mean, what?’) and calling the segment a ‘sparkly story’ and
one we must ‘take in stride,’” and adding that for Maddow “to exaggerate the facts and call OAN
Russian propaganda was consistent with her tone up to that point, and the Court finds a reasonable
viewer would not take the statement as factual given this context”); McDougal v. Fox News
Network, LLC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175768, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2020) (finding that the
“‘general tenor’ of [Carlson’s] show should then inform a viewer that he is not ‘stating actual facts’
about the topics he discusses and is instead engaging in ‘exaggeration’ and ‘non-literal
commentary’”).
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factual assertions—“really literally is paid Russian propaganda”95 and “a
classic case of extortion”96—should be discounted to a large degree because
they are uttered on a news talk show.
Judge Vyskocil in McDougal seemingly was edging her way toward
embracing such a presumption. That was evident when she concluded that
“overheated rhetoric is precisely the kind of pitched commentary that one
expects when tuning in to talk shows like Tucker Carlson Tonight.”97 In
other words, viewers expect hyperbole not just on Carlson’s show, but also,
as the judge wrote, on shows “like” it.98
Are the “minds of the hearers,” to use Meiklejohn’s fine phrase,99
actually served in positive fashion by Carlson’s “bloviating for his
audience,”100 as Judge Vyskocil suggested Carlson’s statements might be
characterized, when it comes to “the voting of wise decisions”?101 That
seems highly doubtful, but Carlson’s approach for conducting a news talk
show certainly seems to serve his ratings. The New York Times recently
reported that “[i]n June and July [2020], Fox News was the highest-rated
television channel in the prime-time hours of 8 to 11 p.m. Not just on cable.
Not just among news networks. All of television.”102 Carlson’s show airs
during that window at 8:00 p.m. weekdays.103
Now, however, there’s another fiscal benefit beyond advertisinggenerating ratings for the over-the-top tack of Carlson and his ilk, namely, a
ready-made defense against defamation lawsuits that no one would believe
that what such hosts state are factual assertions. In other words, there are
two economic incentives for news talk shows to gravitate toward hyperbole
and exaggeration: attracting higher ratings and defending against proplaintiff defamation verdicts. Carlson’s and Maddow’s shows may appear
on cable news channels where one might reasonably expect to hear facts, but

95. Herring Networks, 445 F. Supp. 3d at 1046.
96. McDougal, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175768, at *5.
97. Id. at *19.
98. Id.
99. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 88, at 25.
100. McDougal, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175768, at *17.
101. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 88, at 25.
102. Michael M. Grynbaum, Boycotted. Criticized. But Fox News Leads the Pack in Prime Time,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/09/business/media/fox-newsratings.html (emphasis in original).
103. Tucker Carlson Tonight, FOX NEWS CHANNEL, https://www.foxnews.com/shows/tuckercarlson-tonight (last visited Oct. 15, 2020).
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the nature of how they conduct their programs lets viewers know not to
expect them. In brief, the rulings in McDougal and Herring Networks, while
safeguarding political opinions, incentivize a news talk-show environment
that privileges bluster and fulmination over reason and rationality. It pays
off—at least when it comes to defending against defamation lawsuits—for
news talk shows to charge at full speed toward the issues and people they
attack and do so with a verbal arsenal packed with exaggeration, hyperbole,
and sarcasm.
IV. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court famously observed more than fifty-five years
ago in the seminal defamation case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan that in
the United States there is a “a profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen.”104 In ruling in favor of the talk-show hosts in both McDougal and
Herring Networks, Judge Vyskocil and Judge Bashant certainly embraced
that spirited ethos. Furthermore, as Part II pointed out, the judges’ logic and
reason are fully consistent with the long-standing notion that political
opinions are privileged under the First Amendment and that the journalistic
context or forum where speech is conveyed is relevant in determining if that
speech should be regarded as fact or opinion.105
This Article, however, raised what might be considered an axiological
question of whether, in promoting the value of robust and wide-open
discourse on matters of political and public concern, decisions such as
McDougal and Herring Networks denigrate the values of reasoned debate
and an informed citizenry by encouraging hyperbole and exaggeration on
television news talk shows. Certainly, neither judge ruled that solely
because the allegedly defamatory comments were uttered on such shows
meant that they necessarily should be treated as opinions. Each, however,
made it clear that in taking a larger contextual approach when examining the
fact-versus-opinion dichotomy, the news talk-show context represents an
important contextual variable that militates toward a finding of opinion.106
The more television news talk-show hosts engage in overheated rhetoric,
exaggeration, and colorful commentary, the more likely this presumption is
104. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
105. Supra Part II.
106. See supra notes 12–13, 16 and 26–27.
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to become cemented in defamation law and, in turn, the more likely those
hosts are to wiggle off the hook of defamation liability.
Defamation law, however, should not encourage a race to the bottom
when it comes to political discourse—a race to rhetoric over reason, as it
were. Rather than adopting a sweeping, genre-based presumption that news
talk shows are expected by viewers to trade in protected opinions, courts
should carefully consider each program, along with the reputation of its host,
on an individual basis. That approach might at least slow the development
of a genre-wide presumption. Ultimately, of course, news talk-show hosts
and their respective channels will determine the tenor of their own programs
based on a quest for ratings, but defamation law should not add incentive to
the denigration of discourse about matters of public concern.
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